{"id":57298,"date":"2025-11-07T05:15:00","date_gmt":"2025-11-07T02:15:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/geoconversation.org\/the-arctic-resources-exist-the-economy-does-not\/"},"modified":"2026-05-04T18:31:20","modified_gmt":"2026-05-04T15:31:20","slug":"the-arctic-resources-exist-the-economy-does-not","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/geoconversation.org\/en\/the-arctic-resources-exist-the-economy-does-not\/","title":{"rendered":"The Arctic. Resources exist \u2014 the economy does not"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The world is gradually changing the fuel of its development. If the 20th century was built on oil and gas, the 21st century increasingly relies on metals<\/strong> \u2014 lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements. They are needed in virtually everything: from electric vehicles and servers to solar panels and wind turbines. While global companies are building new supply chains, Russia is betting on the Arctic \u2014 a territory where, according to officials and scientists, the world’s largest reserves of strategic metals are concentrated. <\/p>\n\n

But is this really the case? How real and extractable are these reserves, and can they become the foundation of a new economy? Let us examine this using the example of the Tomtor deposit in Yakutia<\/strong>, which today is being discussed as an “Arctic treasure” and Russia’s possible response to China’s leadership in rare earth metals. <\/p>\n\n

\"Open<\/a>
Open pit at the deposit: mineral extraction in Russia’s northern regions. Source: Investment Portal of the Arctic Zone of Russia<\/a> <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n

The world is moving away from oil: the age of metals begins<\/h2>\n\n

The global economy is changing rapidly: oil and gas are being replaced by metals of the new technological cycle<\/strong> \u2014 lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements. These materials have become the heart of modern industry: they are used to make batteries, electric vehicles, servers, turbines, and renewable energy components<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n

\n

Why is it necessary to work and increase metal reserves?<\/em> \u2014 asks Academician Nikolai Pokhilenko. \u2014 Look: over twenty years, lithium consumption will increase more than forty times, and graphite, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements \u2014 six to seven times. And this is only in sectors related to new energy.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

According to the International Energy Agency, by 2040 global demand for raw materials for “clean energy” will increase at least fourfold, and for certain metals \u2014 tens of times. Even if the transition to a green economy slows down, the world will still face shortages of copper, lithium, and cobalt. <\/p>\n\n

\n

We see that demand is growing in all scenarios, \u2014 notes Pokhilenko. \u2014 Therefore, we need to develop the base for producing these metals now. Otherwise, the deficit will only intensify. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

The energy sector is becoming the main consumer of mineral raw materials, and whoever controls the supply of “transition metals” gains a new strategic advantage<\/a> \u2014 the kind that oil and gas once provided. How are things in Russia in this regard? <\/p>\n\n

\n
\"Growth<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\"Forecast<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\"Share<\/a><\/figure>\n
Forecast of demand growth for mineral raw materials for “clean” energy according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
STEPS (Stated Policies Scenario) \u2014 a scenario based on current policies and commitments of countries. SDS (Sustainable Development Scenario) \u2014 a sustainable development scenario assuming achievement of net-zero emissions by 2050 <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n

Russia in the global race for “transition metals”<\/h2>\n\n

The global market for critical metals is already divided. While dozens of countries trade oil, rare earth elements, lithium, and cobalt are controlled by literally a few players. Today, 60% of rare earths<\/strong> and 80% of graphite<\/strong> are produced by China, and most lithium and nickel processing is also concentrated there. The rest comes from Chile, Peru, Congo, Indonesia, and Australia. <\/p>\n\n

\n

We are doing well with oil and gas, \u2014 says Academician Nikolai Pokhilenko, \u2014 but not so well with metals. Look: copper \u2014 Chile, Peru, China. Nickel \u2014 Indonesia, the Philippines, Russia is only in third place. Cobalt \u2014 mainly Congo. Graphite and rare earths \u2014 China. Lithium \u2014 Australia and China. Russia is almost absent here. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

Such an imbalance turns “transition metals” into a new instrument of geopolitical influence<\/strong> \u2014 what oil was in the last century. Russia remains on the sidelines: we still have strong hydrocarbons<\/a>, but in the metals that shape the future, we are falling behind. <\/p>\n\n

However, reserves exist. While Russia remains on the periphery of the global critical metals market, its subsoil contains enormous reserves of rare earth elements<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong> \u2014 primarily in the north of the country, in the Arctic and Yakutia<\/a>. This is potential that could become the foundation of a new raw materials strategy if an industry capable of not just exploring but also processing such ores is created. <\/p>\n\n

One can start with three directions that experts discuss:<\/p>\n\n

    \n
  1. Reviving old production facilities<\/strong> \u2014 for example, resuming operations at the Lovozero deposit in the Murmansk region.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Co-extraction of rare earth elements<\/strong> from Khibiny apatites, where enrichment facilities already exist.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Development of new deposits<\/strong> \u2014 primarily Tomtor<\/strong>, which accounts for up to 60% of Russia’s balance reserves of rare earth metals<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n

    And if we are talking about Russia’s chances to catch up in the global race for “transition metals,” the conversation should certainly begin with one name \u2014 Tomtor<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n

    \"Chart<\/a>
    Share of the three leading producing countries in global mineral and fossil fuel production according to 2019 data. Production of critical metals today is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of countries \u2014 much more so than oil and gas extraction <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n

    Tomtor: a rare earth giant in the permafrost zone<\/h2>\n\n

    When you look at the map of global critical metals production, Russia is almost absent. But reserves exist \u2014 and they are colossal. Academician Nikolai Pokhilenko provides an example: <\/p>\n\n

    \n

    The Tomtor deposit includes the Buronny, Northern, and Southern sections. In terms of rare element content, it surpasses most global analogues. In just one kilogram of ore \u2014 dozens of grams of neodymium, cerium, lanthanum, dysprosium, and niobium. For comparison: in Brazil, where we buy niobium, its content is 23 kg per ton. In Tomtor \u2014 57 kg. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n

    According to the scientist’s estimates, the total resources of the deposit amount to:<\/p>\n\n